Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5540

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3 TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJ: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: RESTRICTED MEETING OCTOBER 14, 1975

TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO. 48

REF: MOSCOW 14637

1. SUMMARY. AT OCTOBER 14 RESTRICTED MEETING STOESSEL MADE STATEMENT (SEE REFTEL) PRESSING SOVIETS ON NEED TO DEVELOP SERIOUS DIALOGUE ON FIVE MAJOR ISSUES (TIES TO TTBT; APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES; VERIFICATION PROVISIONS IN PROTOCOLS; SOVIET DOMESTIC LAW; AND SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT US VERIFICATION PROVISIONS SEEK UNWARRANTED INFORMATION AND INTEFERENCE WITH PNE PROJECTS) IF WE ARE SUCCESSFULLY TO COMPLETE OUT WORK. MOROKHOV MADE LONG. CONTRARY STATEMENT, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS PRELIMINARY REMARKS WITH FULLY DETAILED REPLY TO FOLLOW, COVERING: (A) TTBT TIES (SAYING SOVIET TEXT ADEQUATELY PROVIDES FOR THIS, AND IF ANYTHING GOVERNS INDEPENDENT PNE AGREEMENT IT IS NPT ARTICLE V WHICH ALSO PROVIDES BASIS FOR MEETING US POINT ABOUT VERIFICATION IN THIRD COUNTRY APPLICATIONS); (B) NEED TO NEGOTIATE FROM SOVIET TEXT (WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT US CONCERNS BUT US REFUSES TO ADDRESS IT); (C) UNWARRANTED INFORMATION AND PROJECT INTERFERENCE (US REFUSES TO ANSWER SOVIET QUESTIONS DIRECTED AT THIS, AND WILL NOT EXPLAIN WHY SUCH WOULD NOT RESULT FROM US PROVI-SECRET

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SIONS WHICH USSR VIEWS AS MORE EXTENSIVE THAN NECESSARY

FOR PURELY VERIFICATION PURPOSES); AND (D) EXISITING SOVIET DOMESTIC LAW (WITH WHICH, MOROKHOV MADE CLEAR, ANY PNE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO SQUARE). MORKHOV DID ELABORATE SOMEWHAT ON HIS EARLIER COMMENTS ABOUT A POSSIBLE JOINT APPROACH TO EQUIPMENT, AND UNDERSCORED AGAIN NEED TO SOLVE OBSERVER SITUATION THROUGH COOPERATION. IT WAS AGREED TO HAVE ANOTHER RESTRICTED MEETING AT 4:00 PM OCTOBER 15, PRECEDED AT 4:00 PM OCTOBER 14 BY RESTRICTED WORKING GROUP EFFORT, HEADED BY BUCHHEIM AND TIMERBAEV, TO DEVELOP PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO FACILITATE GENERAL WORKING GROUP ACTIVITY AND PERHAPS FURTHER EXPLORE DIFFERENCES RELATING TO QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE. END SUMMARY.

- 2. STOESSEL MADE STATEMENT IN RESTRICTED MEETING OCTOBER 14 (STOESSEL/BUCHHEIM/MARTIN/TUNIK MOROKHOV/TIMERBAEV/SAFRONOV/KOVALEV), IN WHICH HE OUTLINED FUNDAMENTAL US VIEWS ON FIVE MAJOR PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE RESOLVED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PNE AGREEMENT. STOESSEL STATEMENT MADE CLEAR THAT US HAD FLEXIBLE APPROACH FOR ACHIEVING THIS GOAL, BUT ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT SUCCESS WOULD DEPEND ON HAVING "AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR PREPARING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT". THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE CLEAR AND PRECISE, WITH "ALL ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS ESTABLISHED IN EXPLICIT AND BINDING TERMS".
- 3. MOROKHOV THANKED STOESSEL FOR HIS FRANK STATEMENT, AND SAID THAT AMBASSADOR CAN "REST ASSURED THAT IT WILL BE STUDIED VERY CAREFULLY". MOROKHOV SAID HE WOULD MAKE ONLY PRELIMINARY REMARKS TODAY, BUT WOULD PROVIDE FULLY DETAILED REPLY LATER.
- 4. WITH RESPECT TO PNE/TTBT RELATIONSHIP, MOROKHOV SAID SOVIET TEXT REFERS TO TTBT, AND ALSO TO NEED TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS. SOVIET TEXT ALSO INDICATES THAT TTBT ARTICLE III OBLIGATES US TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT GOVERNING PNES.
- 5. MOROKHOV SAID HE WISHED TO UNDERLINE IDEA THAT NEGOTIATING TASK DID NOT INVOLVE PREPARING AN AGREEMENT SECRET

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REGULATING OR CONTROLLING ARMS, BUT AGREEMENT GOVERNING PNES. AT SAME TIME, HE ADMITTED IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY THAT THERE BE NO WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS OBTAINED, AND THIS IDEA HE CLAIMED IS REFLECTED IN SOVIET TEXT.

6. ELABORATING, MOROKHOV SAID THAT NPT ARTICLE V PROVIDES FOR OBTAINING BENEFITS FROM PNES, BUT DOES NOT MENTION PLACING LIMITATIONS ON PNES. HE CONCLUDED THAT ONE COULD

NOT SUBSUME A MULTILATERAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT UNDER A BILATERAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.

- 7. AS TO STOESSEL'S POINT THAT COMMON YIELD THRESHOLD IS AN EXAMPLE OF LINK BETWEEN TTBT AND PNE AGREEMENT, MOROKHOV SAID USSR VIEWS THIS AS "A CASE OF MERE COINCIDENCE". PNE REQUIREMENTS CAN BE MET IN GREAT PART AT OR BELOW SUCH A YIELD THRESHOLD; HOWEVER, SOME EXCEPTIONS ARE REQUIRED, AS PROVIDED IN THE SOVIET TEXT. THIS FACT UNDERSCORES THE COINCIDENTAL NATURE OF THE COMMON YIELD THRESHOLD.
- 8. MOROKHOV'S GENERAL CONCLUSION IS THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE FACT THAT PNE AGREEMENT FLOWS FROM TTBT IT IS "AN ABSOLUTELY INDEPENDENT TREATY." (COMMENT: AT THAT POINT TIMERBAEV AND SAFRONOV HUDDLED BEHIND MOROKHOV AND MOROKHOV HAD INTERPRETER CORRECT HIMSELF AND DELETE "ABSOLUTELY". END COMMENT)
- 9. MOROKHOV SIAD SOVIET POSITION ON PROVIDING PNE SERVICES TO THIRD COUNTRIES IS ALSO GOVERNED BY VIEW WHIN HE HAD JUST STATED. US AND USSR SHARE AN OBLIGATION UNDER NPT TO ESTABLISH CERTAIN CONDITIONS FOR PROVISION OF PNES TO THIRD COUNTRIES, BUT THIS DOES NOT ALLOW US TO FORCE THE PROVISIONS IN US TEXT ON THIRD COUNTRIES. ON THIS POINT, MOROKHOV CLAIMED SOVIET TEXT MORE CLOSELY FOLLOWS REQUIREMENTS OF NPT AND THE TTBT.
- 10. AT VERY END OF MEETING MOROKHOV RAISED QUESTION OF COOPERATION, AND SUGGESTED IN THAT CONTEXT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO COVER US THIRD-COUNTRY POINT THROUGH REFERENCE TO NPT IN PNE TEXT. HE SUGGESTED REPHRASING ARTICLE V PARA 3 OF SOVIET TEXT. TIMERBAEV SAID LANGUAGE SUCH AS SECRET

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"WE SHALL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH A VIEW TO IMPLEMENT-ING NPT ARTICLE V ON THE BASIS OF THIS TREATY" MIGHT DO IT.
BUCHHEIM WONDERED IF TIMERBAEV COULD ACCEPT "IN COMPLIANCE WITH" RATHER THAN "ON THE BASIS OF", AND TIMERBAEV SAID HE WAS NOT PROPOSING PRECISE LANGUAGE.

- 11. SEVERAL TIMES IN HIS REMARKS MOROKHOV URGED THAT EXPERTS WORK FROM SOVIET TEXT IN THE WORKING GROUPS, WITH US POSING QUESTIONS AS IT WISHES. HE ASSERTED THAT THIS WOULD BE BEST BASIS FOR GETTING ON WITH WORK. HE CLAIMED, CITING SEVERAL EXAMPLES, THAT US SIDE HAD NOT REPLIED TO EVEN ONE QUESTION OF SOVIET SIDE ABOUT US DRAFT.
- 12. MOROKHOV GAVE SOME EXAMPLES OF WHY USSR BELIEVES US PROVISIONS WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION UNWARRANTED FOR

VERIFICATION PURPOSES AND INTERFERE WITH PNE PROJECTS.

EXAMPLES INCLUDED:

-- PROVISION ALLOWING OBSERVERS TO USE OPTICAL

INTRUMENTS:

- -- UNRESTRICTED OBSERVER ACCESS WITHIN 10-KILOMETER RADIUS ZONE;
- -- OBSERVER PRESENCE THROUGHOUT PERIOD OF EMPLACEMENT HOLE CONSTRUCTION;

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EXDIS

- -- NEED FOR OBSERVERS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON ANY EQUIPMENT AND INSTALLATIONS IN ACCESS AREA;
- -- NEED FOR DESCRIPTION OF ALL EQUIPMENT WITHIN EMPLACEMENT HOLE; AND
- -- OBSERVER REQUIREMENT TO TAKE PHOTOGRAPHS.

 MOROKHOV SAID ALL THESE REQUIREMENT COULD PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES BUT ALSO INFORMATION RELATED TO OTHER PURPOSES, AND IT IS THIS LATTER ASPECT WHICH CONCERNS USSR.

13. ON QUESTION OF SOVIET DEMOSTIC LAW RAISED BY STOESSEL, USSR POISITION IS THAT PNE AGREEMENT SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RESPECTIVE DOMESTIC LAWS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND MAKE ANY ADJUSTMENTS NECESSARY IN THE USUSSR AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO MKE IT CONSISTENT WITH EXISTING DOMESTIC LAW. MOROKHOV STATED HIS CONVICTION THAT TO PROCEED BY MAKING IT NCESSARY TO ADJUST EXISTING

SOVIET DOMESTIC LAW TO CONFORM TO A PNE BILATERAL TREATY WOULD NOT BE FRUITFUL.

14. MOROKHOV SAID THAT STOESSEL'S STATEMENT TODAY MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WAS SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OF SOME OF HIS EARLIER COMMENTS ABOUT OBSERVERS. OBSERVERS, MOROKHOV SAID, COULD OBTAIN INFORMATION DIRECTLY FROM INSTRUMENTS AND WOULD NOT HAVE TO RELY ON BEING GIVEN INFORMATION BY HOST SIDE. HE SAID HIS EARLIER REMARKS SECRET

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HAD BEEN A FIRST PROPOSAL, DETAILS OF WHICH HE AND STOESSEL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS. BECAUSE OF THIS STOESSEL HAD REACHED THE WRONG CONCLUSION.

15. STOESSEL THANKED MOROKHOV FOR HIS CANDOR AND ASKED WHAT THE MINISTER HAD MEANT BY HIS PROPOSAL ON VERIFYING SIDE EQUIPMENT OPERATED BY THE HOST SIDE IN ORDER TO AVOID DOMESTIC LAW PROBLEMS.

16. ON EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY WHERE OBSERVERS WANT TO DETERMINE NUMBER OF EXPLOSIONS IN A GROUP (COMMENT: REFERENCE TO LOCAL SEISMIC NETWORK), MORKHOV SAID VERIFYING SIDE COULD HAND OVER ITS EQUIPMENT TO HOST SIDE "IN GOOD TIME", INCLUDING INSTRUCTIONS ON USE AND HOW EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE INSTALLED. WHEN OBSERVERS ARRIVE THEY CAN VERIFY PROPER USE AND INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT, AND GET INFORMATION FROM SUCH EQUIPMENT IN PRESENCE OF HOST SIDE. THE NEED FOR "INDEPENDENT" EQUIPMENT AROUSES SOVIET SUSPICIONS, MOROKHOV SAID.

17. WITH RESPECT TO SEISMIC EQUIPMENT, MOROKHOV, SAID OBSERVERS COULD TAKE PART IN ITS INSTALLATION. IF A "UNIFIED" INSTRUMENT TO MEASURE YIELDS CAAN BE WORKED OUT, MOROKHOV SAID A SIMILAR PROCEDURE COVERING INSTALLATION COULD BE FOLLOWED.

18. AS TO OBSERVERS IN PNE AREAS, MOROKHOV AGAIN STRESSED SOLVING THIS QUESTION THROUGH COOPERATION. MORKHOV CONCLUDED THAT HIS SUGGESTIONS ON EQUIPMENT AND OBSERVERS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SOLVING VERIFICATION QUESTIONS IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH SOVIET DOMESTIC LAW -- WHICH " GOVERNS NOT THESE CASES ALONE".

19. SOTESSEL STATED AGAIN MAIN POINTS FROM HIS STATE-MENT, PARTICULARLY RELATING TO OBSERVERS, THEIR ACCESS AND EQUIPMENT; TREATY DURATION; AND APPLICATION OF TERMS OF A PNE AGREEMENT TO THIRD COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT ALL THESE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS DESERVE MORE DETAILED EXAMINA-TION BY DELEGATION HEADS AND WORKING GROUPS, AND PROPOSED ANOTHER RESTRICTED MEETING OCTOBER 15 PRECEDED BY A SMALLER WORKING GROUP SESSION THIS AFTERNOON TO WORK OUT A PROCESECRET

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DURAL APPROACH FOR FACILITATING GENERAL WORKING GROUP ACTIVITY. MOROKHOV AGREED TO THIS, ADDING THAT SMALLER WORKING GROUP SHOULD ALSO CONCENTRATE ON QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE AND PASS SUGGESTIONS TO DELEGATION HEADS. STOESSEL

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